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POYNER v. MURRAY
964 F.2d 1404 (1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Syvasky Lafayette Poyner was convicted of five counts of capital
murder after three separate trials and was sentenced to death on all five
counts of capital murder. The record reveals that during an eleven-day
period in 1984, Poyner left five women in Virginia dead, all victims of
gunshot wounds to the head. Poyner was arrested and confessed to all
five killings. During his confession, Poyner told the police that he had
chosen only women because women are afraid of guns and, thus, are
easier to rob than men. He also stated that he had killed his victims so that
they would not be able to identify him later; this was based on advice from
fellow inmates during previous jail terms who had told him that they
wished they had killed their robbery victims.
Although not introduced at trial, Poyner later relied upon, as an
explanation for his killing spree, the affidavit of a psychiatrist that stated
that Poyner may belong to a category of serial killers known as "Psychopathic Sexual Sadists". The psychiatrist also suggested several other
possibilities as the motivation behind Poyner's killings.
Poyner appealed all five convictions and death sentences to the
Supreme Court of Virginia; the court affirmed all convictions. 1 Poyner
then sought collateral review of these convictions in the Virginia state
courts. The three writs of habeas corpus filed on Poyner's behalf were
denied by the respective courts. The Supreme Court of Virginia, finding
no error in any of the denials, subsequently refused Poyner's petitions for
appeal.
Following these successive denials, Poyner sought relief from the
federal courts. Again, three habeas corpus petitions were filed, denied
and dismissed. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal
followed.
HOLDING
Poyner appealed on the following grounds: (1) that the performance
of his counsel was so ineffective that he was denied the right to counsel
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution; (2) that Virginia's system ofappointing counsel to indigent
defendants violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; and (3) that the district court erred in refusing to grant him
an evidentiary hearing on his Mirandaand ineffective assistance claims.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed all of the convictions and
sentences and found that the trial court had not erred on any of the above
2
issues.

1 Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401,329 S.E.2d 815 (1985).
2 Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404 (1992). Poyner's claim that
his Miranda rights had been violated when the state court admitted
certain confessions will not be discussed within the context of this case
summary. However, Virginia attorneys should notice that Poyner's
analysis of Miranda directly contradicts with the Virginia Supreme
Court's narrow approach in King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 416
S.E.2d. 669 (1992). See case summary of King, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue.
3 Id. at 1420.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Expert
Witnesses Claim
Part ofPoyner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel revolved
around counsel's failure to investigate, develop, and present psychiatric
evidence of defendant's psychological condition as a mitigating factor
during the penalty phase of the trial. Poyner argued that if his counsel had
introduced evidence of his condition, the jury might have found that he
was driven by motives other than simply a desire to prevent his victims
from identifying him as the robber. He asserted that if this had been done
the jury would have found this to be a mitigating factor.
The Fourth Circuit stated that their problem with this reasoning was
two-fold. First, the court felt that the complaint of ineffective assistance
3
seemed to be aimed more at the psychiatrist than at Poyner's counsel.
As a result of this characterization of Poyner's claim, the court saw the
defendant as really making an "ineffective expert witness" claim, rather
than alleging ineffective assistance ofcounsel. The court held, however,
that there was no separately-cognizable constitutional claim for an
4
ineffective expert witness.
Attorneys should be aware of the court's refusal to characterize this
type of claim as one that constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court did not close the door entirely on habeas relief for a "substandard" performance by a psychiatrist, but made clear that to succeed on an
ineffective assistance claim, the deficiency must be attributable to
counsel.5 Thus, in setting forth any ineffective assistance of counsel
argument, defense must focus on counsel's ineffectiveness in presenting
and developing the evidence, so that the court will not be able to dismiss
the claim by pointing a finger at a participant who is not constitutionally
encompassed within ineffective assistance claims.
Second, the court found that counsel's failure to "shop around" for
a more effective psychiatrist 6 and to pursue some of the psychiatric
avenues advocated by one of the evaluating psychiatrists did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.7 The court viewed counsel's
decision to avoid introducing this often risky testimony as a tactical
'8
decision "well within the range of reasonable professional standards."
The court also found that even to the extent defense counsel's performance was deficient, Poyner had not satisfied the "prejudice prong" of
the Stricklandv. Washingtonstandard by showing how the new evidence
would have likely changed the outcome. 9

4 Poyner,964 F.2d at 1419.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1420.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1421 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)). For a general discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, see Marlowe, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel or "How I Can
Satisfy the Sixth Amendment and Still Not Help My Client, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol.3, No.1, p. 2 9 (1990).
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H. Procedural Default and the "Novelty Exception"
As to Poyner's claim that Virginia's method for appointing counsel
is unconstitutional, the court found it barred under Virginia's procedural
default rule. Poyner asserted the following as "cause" justifying his
procedural default: (I) his claim that Virginia's system of appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants violated the Constitution was so novel
that it fell within the scope ofReed v. RosslO; (2) his trial counsel's failure
to raise the objection amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel; and (3) the gravity of the sentence he faced militated in favor
of allowing the issue to be heard.
Reed v. Ross held that procedural default may be excused when the
defaulted claim is "so novel that its legal basis [was] not reasonably
availableto [trial] counsel.. ."1 I Thecourt inPoynerstatedthatPoyner's
claim clearly did not fall within the ambit of the Ross novelty exception,
both because the Sixth Amendment claim was not "novel" and because
Poyner had not shown prejudice. 12 The court distinguished Ross by
pointing out that the legal argument held to be sufficiently novel in Ross
to excuse a procedural default was one which the United States Supreme
Court had later adopted and held to be retroactive. In Poyner's case, the
court observed that "the Court has made no such pronouncement regarding Poyner's challenge to Virginia's system of appointment of coun13
sel.,,
However, the court did note that there is much ambiguity within the
judiciary as to what definitively constitutes a "novel exception". There
has been much discussion over whether the legal claim in question
always must have been subsequently adopted and held retroactive by the
Supreme Court in order to qualify. Some subsequent Supreme Court and
circuit court decisions discussing Ross do not note any such requirement. 14 Thus, although the standards for finding a claim to be "novel"
are high, attorneys should continue to argue Ross and present arguments
that their claim falls within its scope, as the requirements for this
exception have yet to be precisely defined.

M. The Requirements for Obtaining an Evidentiary Hearing
Poyner claimed that he was improperly denied his request for an
evidentiary hearing on his Mirandaand ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. Poyner asserted that an evidentiary hearing would have enabled
him to develop facts sufficient to demonstrate that his confessions were
obtained inviolationof his Fifth Amendmentrights and thathis attorney's
10 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
11 Id. at 16.
12 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1424-25.
13 Id. at 1424.
14 See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier,477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); and
Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1242 (4th Cir. 1988).
15 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). In addition, attorneys should keep in
mind that Townsend claims can be procedurally defaulted, stressing

actions violated the Sixth Amendment.
The court began by noting that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing only if, "(1) he alleges additional facts that, if true,
would entitle him to relief; and (2) he is able to establish the existence of
any of the six factors set out by the Supreme Court in Townsend v.
Sain." 15 The Townsend Court held that a habeas petitioner is entitled to
such a hearing if:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and
fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it
appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
16
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Applying the standard to Poyner's Mirandaclaim, the court stated that
it was satisfied that Poyner had been afforded ample opportunity to
17
develop the facts required and thus had not met the Townsend standard.
As to Poyner's a claim that he was erroneously denied an evidentiary
hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel, the court again disagreed,
noting that the Fourth Circuit had held in Becton v. Barnett18 that a
habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only to
resolve disputed issues of material fact. 19 In addition, Becton requires
that the petitioner "present a colorable claim" to relief by showing that
the additional facts, if found to be true, would at least in argument
necessitate the granting of the writ. 20 Because the court found these
factors were not met by Poyner, it concluded he was not entitled to an
21
evidentiary hearing.
Practicing attorneys who represent clients in collateral criminal
proceedings must keep in mind the strict standards that must be met to be
granted an evidentiary hearing. Defense counsel must be prepared to
demonstrate how theirclaims meet the requirements set forth in Townsend
and Becton, both as to the insufficiency of any state hearings that were
held and as to how the facts to be shown could have a material effect.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James

again the need to request an evidentiary hearing whenever possible. See
Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S.Ct. 1715 (1992).
16 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.
17 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1415.
18 920 F.2d 1190, 1192 (4th Cir.1990).
19 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1422.
20 Becton, 920 F.2d at 1192 (emphasis added).
21 Poyner, 964 F.2d at 1416.

